

116TH CONGRESS  
1ST SESSION

# H. R. 4331

To modify and reauthorize the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002, and for other purposes.

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## IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

SEPTEMBER 13, 2019

Mr. MCGOVERN (for himself, Mr. SMITH of New Jersey, Ms. KAPTUR, Mr. SHERMAN, Mr. MEADOWS, Mr. SUOZZI, Mr. MALINOWSKI, and Mr. MCADAMS) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and in addition to the Committee on the Judiciary, for a period to be subsequently determined by the Speaker, in each case for consideration of such provisions as fall within the jurisdiction of the committee concerned

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## A BILL

To modify and reauthorize the Tibetan Policy Act of 2002,  
and for other purposes.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*  
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 **SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.**

4 This Act may be cited as the “Tibetan Policy and  
5 Support Act of 2019”.

1 **SEC. 2. MODIFICATIONS TO AND REAUTHORIZATION OF TI-**  
2 **BETAN POLICY ACT OF 2002.**

3 (a) TIBETAN NEGOTIATIONS.—Section 613 of the Ti-  
4 betan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amend-  
5 ed—

6 (1) in subsection (a)—

7 (A) in paragraph (1)—

8 (i) by inserting “without pre-  
9 conditions” after “a dialogue”;

10 (ii) by inserting “or Central Tibetan  
11 Administration representatives” after “his  
12 representatives”; and

13 (iii) by adding at the end before the  
14 period the following: “and should coordi-  
15 nate with other governments in multilat-  
16 eral efforts toward this goal”;

17 (B) by redesignating paragraph (2) as  
18 paragraph (3); and

19 (C) by inserting after paragraph (1) the  
20 following:

21 “(2) POLICY COMMUNICATION.—The President  
22 shall direct the Secretary of State to ensure that, in  
23 accordance with this Act, United States policy on  
24 Tibet, as coordinated by the United States Special  
25 Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, is communicated to

1 all Federal departments and agencies in contact with  
2 the Government of the People’s Republic of China.”;

3 (2) in subsection (b)—

4 (A) in the matter preceding paragraph  
5 (1)—

6 (i) by striking “until December 31,  
7 2021”; and

8 (ii) by inserting “and direct the De-  
9 partment of State to make public on its  
10 website” after “appropriate congressional  
11 committees”;

12 (B) in paragraph (1), by striking “and” at  
13 the end;

14 (C) in paragraph (2), by striking the pe-  
15 riod at the end and inserting a semicolon; and

16 (D) by adding at the end the following:

17 “(3) the steps taken by the United States Gov-  
18 ernment to promote the human rights and genuine  
19 cultural, religious, linguistic, and national identity of  
20 the Tibetan people, including the right of the Ti-  
21 betan people to choose their own religious leaders in  
22 accordance with their established religious practice  
23 and system; and

24 “(4) an analysis of United States business ac-  
25 tivities in Tibet, whether those activities employ Ti-

1       betans and how many, whether those activities are  
 2       consistent with the protection of the environment  
 3       and Tibetan cultural traditions, and whether those  
 4       activities contribute to or support, through goods or  
 5       services, the surveillance of the people of Tibet.”.

6       (b) ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN TIBET.—Section  
 7       616 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended—

8               (1) in subsection (d)—

9                       (A) in paragraph (5), by inserting “human  
 10                      rights” after “respect Tibetan”;

11                     (B) in paragraph (8), by striking “and” at  
 12                      the end;

13                     (C) in paragraph (9), by striking the pe-  
 14                      riod at the end and inserting “; and”; and

15                     (D) by adding at the end the following:

16               “(10) neither provide incentive for, nor facili-  
 17               tate the involuntary or coerced relocation of, Tibetan  
 18               nomads from their traditional pasturelands into con-  
 19               centrated settlements.”; and

20               (2) by adding at the end the following:

21       “(e) PRIVATE SECTOR INVESTMENT.—The Secretary  
 22       of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Commerce,  
 23       should—

24               “(1) encourage United States businesses and  
 25       individuals that are engaged in commerce or invest-

1 ing in enterprises in Tibet to abide by the principles  
2 contained in subsection (d) and the United Nations  
3 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights;  
4 and

5 “(2) request that such businesses and individ-  
6 uals provide to the Department of State periodic re-  
7 ports on their adherence to such principles.

8 “(f) UNITED STATES ASSISTANCE.—The President  
9 shall provide grants to nongovernmental organizations to  
10 support sustainable economic development, cultural and  
11 historical preservation, health care, education, and envi-  
12 ronmental sustainability projects for Tibetan communities  
13 in Tibet, in accordance with the principles specified in sub-  
14 section (d) and subject to the review and approval of the  
15 United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues  
16 under section 621(d) or, if the Coordinator has not been  
17 appointed, the Assistant Secretary of State for Democ-  
18 racy, Human Rights, and Labor.”.

19 (c) DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION RELATING TO  
20 TIBET.—Section 618 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 6901 note)  
21 is amended to read as follows:

22 **“SEC. 618. DIPLOMATIC REPRESENTATION RELATING TO**  
23 **TIBET.**

24 “(a) UNITED STATES CONSULATE IN LHASA,  
25 TIBET.—

1           “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall seek to  
2       establish a United States consulate in Lhasa, Tibet,  
3       to provide consular services to United States citizens  
4       traveling in Tibet and to monitor political, economic,  
5       and cultural developments in Tibet.

6           “(2) CONSULAR DISTRICTS.—The Secretary  
7       should organize the United States Embassy’s con-  
8       sular districts within the People’s Republic of China  
9       so that all areas designated as autonomous for Ti-  
10      betans are contained within the same consular dis-  
11      trict.

12       “(b) TIBET SECTION IN UNITED STATES EMBASSY  
13   IN BEIJING, CHINA.—

14           “(1) IN GENERAL.—The Secretary shall estab-  
15      lish a Tibet section within the United States Em-  
16      bassy in Beijing, China, to follow political, economic,  
17      and social developments in Tibet until such time as  
18      a United States consulate in Lhasa, Tibet, is estab-  
19      lished under subsection (a).

20           “(2) DUTIES.—The Tibet section established  
21      under paragraph (1) shall have the primary respon-  
22      sibility of reporting on human rights issues and ac-  
23      cess to Tibet by United States Government officials,  
24      journalists, non-governmental organizations, and the  
25      Tibetan diaspora and shall work in close cooperation

1 with the United States Special Coordinator for Ti-  
2 betan Issues.

3 “(c) POLICY.—The Secretary should not authorize  
4 the establishment in the United States of any additional  
5 consulate of the People’s Republic of China until such  
6 time as a United States consulate in Lhasa, Tibet, is es-  
7 tablished under subsection (a).”.

8 (d) RELIGIOUS PERSECUTION IN TIBET.—Section  
9 620(b) of such Act (22 U.S.C. 6901 note) is amended by  
10 adding at the end before the period the following: “, in-  
11 cluding with respect to the reincarnation system of Ti-  
12 betan Buddhism”.

13 (e) UNITED STATES SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR TI-  
14 BETAN ISSUES.—Section 621 of such Act (22 U.S.C. 6901  
15 note) is amended—

16 (1) in subsection (c) to read as follows:

17 “(c) OBJECTIVES.—The objectives of the Special Co-  
18 ordinator are to—

19 “(1) promote substantive dialogue without pre-  
20 conditions between the Government of the People’s  
21 Republic of China and the Dalai Lama or his rep-  
22 resentatives or Central Tibetan Administration rep-  
23 resentatives leading to a negotiated agreement on  
24 Tibet;

1           “(2) encourage the Government of the People’s  
2       Republic of China to address the aspirations of the  
3       Tibetan people with regard to their cultural, reli-  
4       gious, linguistic, and national identity;

5           “(3) promote the human rights and religious  
6       freedoms of the Tibetan people, including women’s  
7       human rights;

8           “(4) promote activities to preserve the distinct  
9       environment and water resources of the Tibetan pla-  
10      teau;

11          “(5) promote economic development as enumer-  
12      ated in section 616(e) of this Act; and

13          “(6) promote access to Tibet in accordance with  
14      the Reciprocal Access to Tibet Act of 2018.”;

15          (2) in subsection (d)—

16              (A) in paragraph (5), by striking “and” at  
17      the end;

18              (B) by redesignating paragraph (6) as  
19      paragraph (8); and

20              (C) by inserting after paragraph (5) the  
21      following:

22          “(6) review and approve all projects carried out  
23      pursuant to section 616(f) and section 7(b) of the  
24      Tibetan Policy and Support Act of 2019;



1           “(7) seek to establish international diplomatic  
2       coalitions to—

3           “(A) oppose any effort by the Government  
4       of the People’s Republic of China to identify or  
5       install Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders in a  
6       manner inconsistent with the established reli-  
7       gious practice and system of Tibetan Bud-  
8       dhism; and

9           “(B) ensure that the identification and in-  
10      stallation of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders,  
11      including a future 15th Dalai Lama, is deter-  
12      mined solely within the Tibetan Buddhist faith  
13      community, in accordance with the universally-  
14      recognized right to religious freedom; and”; and  
15      (3) by adding at the end the following:

16      “(e) PERSONNEL.—The Secretary shall assign not  
17      less than three individuals to the Office of the Special Co-  
18      ordinator to assist in the management of the responsibil-  
19      ities of this section.”.

20      (f) GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITION OF TIBET.—Such Act  
21      (22 U.S.C. 6901 note), as so amended, is further amended  
22      by adding at the end the following:

1 **“SEC. 622. GEOGRAPHIC DEFINITION OF TIBET.**

2 “In this Act and in implementing policies relating to  
3 the Tibetan people under other provisions of law, the term  
4 ‘Tibet’, unless otherwise specified, means—

5 “(1) the Tibet Autonomous Region; and

6 “(2) the Tibetan areas of Qinghai, Sichuan,  
7 Gansu, and Yunnan provinces.”.

8 **SEC. 3. STATEMENT OF POLICY REGARDING THE SUCCESSION OR REINCARNATION OF THE DALAI**  
9 **LAMA.**  
10

11 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

12 (1) Tibetan Buddhism is practiced in many  
13 countries including the People’s Republic of China,  
14 Bhutan, Nepal, Mongolia, India, the Russian Fed-  
15 eration, and the United States.

16 (2) No single political entity encompasses the  
17 territory in which Tibetan Buddhism is practiced.

18 (3) The Dalai Lama is widely revered by Ti-  
19 betan Buddhists and those who practice Tibetan  
20 Buddhism around the world, including those in the  
21 United States, as their spiritual leader.

22 (4) Under the Tibetan Buddhist belief system,  
23 there have been 14 persons recognized as the Dalai  
24 Lama, each a manifestation of the Bodhisattva of  
25 Compassion, selected according to the spiritual tra-  
26 ditions and practices of Tibetan Buddhism.

1           (5) The 14th Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso,  
2           issued a statement on September 24, 2011, explain-  
3           ing the traditions and spiritual precepts of the selec-  
4           tion of Dalai Lamas, setting forth his views on the  
5           considerations and process for selecting his suc-  
6           cessor, and providing a response to the Chinese gov-  
7           ernment's claims that only the Chinese government  
8           has the ultimate authority in the selection process of  
9           the Dalai Lama.

10          (6) The 14th Dalai Lama said in his statement  
11          that if a decision to continue the institution of the  
12          Dalai Lama is made, that the responsibility shall  
13          primarily rest with the Dalai Lama's Gaden  
14          Phodrang Trust, who will be informed by the written  
15          instructions of the 14th Dalai Lama.

16          (7) Since 2011, the 14th Dalai Lama has reit-  
17          erated publicly on numerous occasions that decisions  
18          on the succession or reincarnation of the next Dalai  
19          Lama belongs to the Tibetan Buddhist faith commu-  
20          nity alone.

21          (8) The Government of the People's Republic of  
22          China has interfered in the process of recognizing a  
23          successor or reincarnation of Tibetan Buddhist lead-  
24          ers, including in 1995 by arbitrarily detaining  
25          Gedhun Choekyi Nyima, a 6-year old boy who was

1 identified as the 11th Panchen Lama, and pur-  
2 porting to install its own candidate as the Panchen  
3 Lama.

4 (9) During his confirmation hearings to be Sec-  
5 retary of State, Michael Pompeo testified to the Sen-  
6 ate Foreign Relations Committee that “If confirmed,  
7 I will press the Chinese government to respect the  
8 legitimacy of Tibetan Buddhists’ religious practices.  
9 This includes the decisions of Tibetan Buddhists in  
10 selecting, educating, and venerating the lamas who  
11 lead the faith, such as the Dalai Lama.”.

12 (10) The Department of State’s Report on  
13 International Religious Freedom for 2017 reported  
14 on policies and efforts of the Government of the  
15 People’s Republic of China to exert control over the  
16 selection of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders, in-  
17 cluding reincarnate lamas, and stated that “U.S. of-  
18 ficials underscored that decisions on the reincarna-  
19 tion of the Dalai Lama should be made solely by  
20 faith leaders.”.

21 (11) In July 2015, Under Secretary of State  
22 for Civilian Security, Democracy and Human  
23 Rights, Sarah Sewall, serving concurrently as United  
24 States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues, testi-  
25 fied to Congress that “the basic and universally rec-

1        ognized right of religious freedom demands that any  
2        decision on the next Dalai Lama be reserved to the  
3        current Dalai Lama, Tibetan Buddhist leaders, and  
4        the Tibetan people”.

5            (12) On June 8, 2015, the United States  
6        House of Representatives unanimously approved  
7        House Resolution 337 which calls on the United  
8        States Government to “underscore that government  
9        interference in the Tibetan reincarnation process is  
10       a violation of the internationally recognized right to  
11       religious freedom, and that matters related to rein-  
12       carnations in Tibetan Buddhism are of keen interest  
13       to Tibetan Buddhist populations worldwide”.

14           (13) On April 25, 2018, the United States Sen-  
15       ate unanimously approved Senate Resolution 429  
16       which “expresses its sense that the identification  
17       and installation of Tibetan Buddhist religious lead-  
18       ers, including a future 15th Dalai Lama, is a matter  
19       that should be determined solely within the Tibetan  
20       Buddhist faith community, in accordance with the  
21       inalienable right to religious freedom”.

22       (b) STATEMENT OF POLICY.—It is the policy of the  
23       United States that—

24           (1) decisions regarding the identification and  
25       installation of Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders, in-

1 including a future 15th Dalai Lama, are exclusively  
2 spiritual matters that should be made by the appro-  
3 priate religious authorities within the Tibetan Bud-  
4 dhist tradition and in the context of the will of reli-  
5 gious practitioners and the instructions of the 14th  
6 Dalai Lama; and

7 (2) interference by the Government of the Peo-  
8 ple's Republic of China or any other government in  
9 the process of recognizing a successor or reincarna-  
10 tion of the Dalai Lama would represent a clear vio-  
11 lation of the fundamental religious freedoms of Ti-  
12 betan Buddhists and the Tibetan people.

13 (c) AMENDMENTS TO FOREIGN RELATIONS AUTHOR-  
14 IZATION ACT, FISCAL YEARS 1990 AND 1991.—Section  
15 901(b) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal  
16 Years 1990 and 1991 (Public Law 101–246; 104 Stat.  
17 80) is amended—

18 (1) by redesignating paragraphs (7), (8), and  
19 (9) as paragraphs (8), (9), and (10), respectively;  
20 and

21 (2) by inserting after paragraph (6) the fol-  
22 lowing:

23 “(7) protecting the internationally recognized  
24 right to the freedom of religion and belief, including  
25 ensuring that the identification and installation of

1 Tibetan Buddhist religious leaders, including a fu-  
2 ture 15th Dalai Lama, is a matter determined solely  
3 within the Tibetan Buddhist faith community, based  
4 on instructions of the 14th Dalai Lama, without in-  
5 terference by the Government of the People’s Repub-  
6 lic of China;”.

7 (d) HOLDING CHINESE OFFICIALS RESPONSIBLE  
8 FOR RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ABUSES TARGETING TIBETAN  
9 BUDDHISTS.—It is the policy of the United States—

10 (1) to consider any effort by the Government of  
11 the People’s Republic of China to identify or install  
12 its own candidate as the future 15th Dalai Lama of  
13 Tibetan Buddhism to be—

14 (A) a serious human rights abuse as such  
15 term is used in Executive Order 13818 (2017);  
16 and

17 (B) a particularly severe violation of reli-  
18 gious freedom for purposes of applying section  
19 212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and Nation-  
20 ality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(G)); and

21 (2) to consider any official of the Government  
22 of the People’s Republic of China determined to be  
23 complicit in identifying or installing a government-  
24 approved candidate as the future 15th Dalai Lama,  
25 contrary to the instructions provided by the 14th

1 Dalai Lama, and one not recognized by the faith  
 2 community of Tibetan Buddhists globally to be sub-  
 3 ject to sanctions described in Executive Order 13818  
 4 (2017) and to inadmissibility into the United States  
 5 under section 212(a)(2)(G) of the Immigration and  
 6 Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)).

7 (e) DEPARTMENT OF STATE PROGRAMMING TO PRO-  
 8 MOTE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM FOR TIBETAN BUDDHISTS.—  
 9 Consistent with section 401 of the Frank R. Wolf Inter-  
 10 national Religious Freedom Act (Public Law 114–281;  
 11 130 Stat. 1436), of the funds available to the Department  
 12 of State for international religious freedom programs, the  
 13 Ambassador-at-Large for International Religious Freedom  
 14 should provide funding to vigorously protect and promote  
 15 international religious freedom in China and for programs  
 16 to protect Tibetan Buddhism in China and elsewhere.

17 **SEC. 4. REPORTING ON TIBET UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL**  
 18 **RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT OF 1998.**

19 Section 102(b)(1) of the International Religious  
 20 Freedom Act of 1998 (22 U.S.C. 6412(b)(1)) is amend-  
 21 ed—

22 (1) in subparagraph (B), by striking “, includ-  
 23 ing policies” and inserting “, including interference  
 24 in the right of religious communities to choose their  
 25 leaders, policies”; and



1 (2) by adding at the end the following:

2 “(H) CHINA.—Because matters relating to  
3 religious freedom in China are complex in scope  
4 and intensity and often vary by ethnicity and  
5 geographic or administrative region, each chap-  
6 ter on China in the Annual Report shall include  
7 separate sections on—

8 “(i) Tibet;

9 “(ii) the Xinjiang Uyghur Autono-  
10 mous Region;

11 “(iii) Hong Kong and Macau;

12 “(iv) unrecognized or independent  
13 Catholics and Protestant ‘house churches’;  
14 and

15 “(v) Falun Gong and other faith-  
16 based or new religious movements.”.

17 **SEC. 5. POLICY REGARDING THE ENVIRONMENT AND**  
18 **WATER RESOURCES ON THE TIBETAN PLA-**  
19 **TEAU.**

20 (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

21 (1) Glaciers in Tibet feed ten of the major riv-  
22 ers of South and East Asia, which supply freshwater  
23 to an estimated 1.8 billion people.

24 (2) Chinese scientists have reported that since  
25 1960 the Tibetan Plateau’s annual average tempera-

1       ture has increased at twice the global average, caus-  
2       ing melting of the glaciers, which will result in vari-  
3       able water flows in the future.

4               (3) Tibet's rivers support wetlands that play a  
5       key role in water storage, water quality, and the reg-  
6       ulation of water flow, and support biodiversity, fos-  
7       ter vegetation growth, and act as carbon sinks.

8               (4) The grasslands of Tibet play a significant  
9       role in carbon production and sequestration.

10              (5) Changes in permafrost levels, caused by ris-  
11       ing temperatures and intensifying evaporation, can  
12       affect the water supply, cause desertification, and  
13       destabilize infrastructure on the Tibetan Plateau  
14       and beyond.

15              (6) The warming of the Tibetan plateau may  
16       cause changes in the monsoon cycle in South and  
17       Southeast Asia, which could lead to droughts or  
18       floods that overwhelm infrastructure and damage  
19       crops.

20              (7) The resettlement of nomads from Tibetan  
21       grasslands undermines the application of traditional  
22       stewardship practices developed though centuries of  
23       pastoral practices, which can be key to mitigating  
24       the negative effects of warming on the Tibetan Pla-  
25       teau.

1           (8) The construction of large hydroelectric  
2 power dams in Tibet, planned to be used in part to  
3 transmit power to Chinese provinces outside of  
4 Tibet, as well as other infrastructure projects, in-  
5 cluding the Sichuan-Tibet railroad may also lead to  
6 the resettlement of thousands of Tibetans and trans-  
7 form the environment.

8           (9) Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam are  
9 members of the Mekong River Commission, which  
10 promotes sustainable management and development  
11 of water and related resources among member na-  
12 tions.

13          (10) The People's Republic of China is not a  
14 full party to the Mekong River Commission.

15          (11) The People's Republic of China has ap-  
16 proximately 20 percent of the world's population but  
17 only around 7 percent of the world's water supply,  
18 with India and the rest of South and Southeast Asia  
19 also relying on the rivers flowing from the  
20 Himalayas of the Tibetan Plateau.

21          (12) The People's Republic of China has al-  
22 ready completed water transfer programs diverting  
23 billions of cubic meters of water yearly and there are  
24 plans to divert more waters from the Tibetan pla-  
25 teau in China.

1 (b) WATER RESOURCES IN TIBET AND THE TIBETAN  
2 WATERSHED.—The Secretary of State, in coordination  
3 with relevant agencies of the United States Government,  
4 shall—

5 (1) pursue collaborative efforts with Chinese  
6 and international scientific institutions to monitor  
7 the environment on the Tibetan Plateau, including  
8 glacial retreat, temperature rise, and carbon levels,  
9 in order to promote a greater understanding of the  
10 effects on permafrost, river flows, grasslands and  
11 desertification, and the monsoon cycle;

12 (2) engage with the Government of the People's  
13 Republic of China and nongovernmental organiza-  
14 tions to encourage the participation of Tibetan no-  
15 mads and other Tibetan stakeholders in the develop-  
16 ment and implementation of grassland management  
17 policies, in order to utilize their indigenous experi-  
18 ence in mitigation and stewardship of the land and  
19 to assess policies on the forced resettlement of no-  
20 mads; and

21 (3) encourage a regional framework on water  
22 security, or use existing frameworks, such as the  
23 Lower Mekong Initiative, to facilitate cooperative  
24 agreements among all riparian nations that would  
25 promote transparency, sharing of information, pollu-

1       tion regulation, and arrangements on impounding  
2       and diversion of waters that originate on the Ti-  
3       betan Plateau.

4       (c) TIBETAN WATER RESOURCES AND NATIONAL SE-  
5       CURITY.—Section 1202(b) of the National Defense Au-  
6       thorization Act of 2000 (Public Law 106–65; 10 U.S.C.  
7       113 note) is amended by adding at the end the following:

8               “(29) Tibet’s strategic importance and the stra-  
9       tegic importance of water resources from the Ti-  
10      betan Plateau in regional and territorial disputes.”.

11   **SEC. 6. DEMOCRACY IN THE TIBETAN EXILE COMMUNITY.**

12      (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

13           (1) The 14th Dalai Lama has overseen a proc-  
14      ess of democratization within the Tibetan polity, be-  
15      ginning in Tibet in the 1950s and continuing in exile  
16      from the 1960s to the present.

17           (2) The first representative body in Tibetan his-  
18      tory, formed on September 2, 1960, was the pre-  
19      cursor of the Tibetan Parliament in Exile, the legis-  
20      lative branch within the Central Tibetan Administra-  
21      tion.

22           (3) The first direct election for the chief execu-  
23      tive of the Central Tibetan Administration was held  
24      on July 29, 2001, with the election of Professor  
25      Samdhong Rinpoche.

1           (4) On March 10, 2011, the 14th Dalai Lama  
2           announced that he would relinquish his political re-  
3           sponsibilities and on August 8, 2011, he transferred  
4           full political power to the elected leadership of the  
5           Central Tibetan Administration.

6           (5) On March 20, 2011, members of the Ti-  
7           betan exile community across some 30 countries held  
8           elections, monitored by international observers and  
9           assessed to be free and fair, to select the next par-  
10          liament and chief executive.

11          (6) As a result of the codification of the trans-  
12          fer of political power from the Dalai Lama, the  
13          Kalon Tripa, or Chief of the Cabinet, assumed full  
14          executive authority and the Tibetan Parliament in  
15          Exile assumed full legislative authority within the  
16          Central Tibetan Administration.

17          (7) As a result of the 2011 elections, the 15th  
18          Tibetan Parliament was seated and Lobsang Sangay  
19          was chosen as Kalon Tripa, a title changed to  
20          Sikyong in 2012.

21          (8) Approximately six million Tibetans in Tibet  
22          do not enjoy a democratic form of government or the  
23          ability to elect their political representatives.

24          (9) Section 355 of the Foreign Relations Au-  
25          thorization Act, Fiscal Years 1992 and 1993 ex-

1       pressed the sense of Congress that Tibet's true rep-  
2       resentatives are the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan  
3       government-in-exile as recognized by the Tibetan  
4       people and that Tibet has maintained throughout its  
5       history a distinctive and sovereign national, cultural,  
6       and religious identity separate from that of China  
7       and, except during periods of illegal Chinese occupa-  
8       tion, has maintained a separate and sovereign polit-  
9       ical and territorial identity.

10           (10) The Middle Way Approach, the official  
11       policy of the Central Tibetan Administration, seeks  
12       genuine autonomy for the six million Tibetans in  
13       Tibet.

14       (b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
15       gress that—

16           (1) Tibetan exile communities around the world  
17       should be commended for the successful adoption of  
18       a system of self governance with democratic institu-  
19       tions and free elections to choose their leaders;

20           (2) the Dalai Lama should be commended for  
21       his decision to transfer political authority to elected  
22       leaders in accordance with democratic principles;

23           (3) the Central Tibetan Administration legiti-  
24       mately represents and reflects the aspirations of Ti-

1       betan people around the world and the Sikyong is  
2       the President of the Central Tibetan Administration;

3           (4) as consistent with section 621(d)(3) of the  
4       Tibetan Policy Act of 2002 (22 U.S.C. 6901 note),  
5       the United States Special Coordinator for Tibetan  
6       Issues should continue to maintain close contact  
7       with the religious, cultural, and elected leaders of  
8       the Tibetan people; and

9           (5) the adoption of democracy within the Ti-  
10      betan exile community can serve as an example to  
11      other sub-national or non-sovereign communities  
12      around the world.

13 **SEC. 7. SUSTAINABILITY IN TIBETAN COMMUNITIES SEEK-**  
14 **ING TO PRESERVE THEIR CULTURE, RELI-**  
15 **GION, AND LANGUAGE.**

16       (a) FINDINGS.—Congress finds the following:

17           (1) Following the flight into exile of the Dalai  
18       Lama and tens of thousands of fellow Tibetans, the  
19       Government of India graciously granted land on  
20       which the Tibetan refugees could settle.

21           (2) Under the leadership of the Dalai Lama,  
22       Tibetan refugees established in settlements in India,  
23       Nepal, and Bhutan monastic, cultural, and edu-  
24       cational institutions for the purpose of preserving



1       their religion, culture, and language until the time  
2       that they could return to Tibet.

3           (3) Many of the Tibetan settlements are more  
4       than 50 years old with aging infrastructure, chal-  
5       lenging the capacity to absorb new refugees and pro-  
6       vide modern services and gainful employment.

7           (4) The threats to Tibetan culture, religion, and  
8       language in the People's Republic of China justify  
9       support for efforts by Tibetans outside China to pre-  
10      serve their heritage.

11          (5) Many long-staying Tibetans in Nepal have  
12      not received documentation that would provide legal  
13      resident status and allow them fuller access to edu-  
14      cational opportunities and sustainable participation  
15      in the economy and society of Nepal.

16          (6) It is United States policy to promote the  
17      human rights of the Tibetan people and the preser-  
18      vation of the distinct Tibetan cultural, religious, and  
19      linguistic heritage.

20          (7) The Dalai Lama has said that the Central  
21      Tibetan Administration will cease to exist once a ne-  
22      gotiated settlement has been achieved that allows Ti-  
23      betans to freely enjoy their culture, religion, and lan-  
24      guage in Tibet.

1       (b) DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.—Of the amount au-  
2 thorized to be appropriated for development assistance for  
3 fiscal year 2020, such sums as may be necessary are au-  
4 thorized to be available to support the preservation of Ti-  
5 betan cultural, religious, and linguistic heritage, as well  
6 as the education, skills development, and entrepreneurship  
7 of Tibetans residing in settlements in South Asia, subject  
8 to review and approval of the United States Special Coor-  
9 dinator for Tibetan Issues.

10       (c) STATUS OF TIBETANS IN NEPAL.—The Secretary  
11 of State shall urge the Government of Nepal to provide  
12 legal documentation to long-staying Tibetan residents in  
13 Nepal who fled a credible threat of persecution in Tibet  
14 in order to allow them to more fully participate in the  
15 economy and society of Nepal.

16       (d) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Con-  
17 gress that the Office of Tibet in Washington, DC, is the  
18 representative office in the United States of the Dalai  
19 Lama and the Central Tibetan Administration.

20       (e) SUNSET.—This section shall terminate on the  
21 date that is one year after the date on which the Secretary  
22 of State certifies to Congress that a negotiated settlement  
23 between the Government of the People’s Republic of China  
24 and the Dalai Lama or his representatives on Tibet has  
25 been concluded.

1 **SEC. 8. AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.**

2 (a) OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES SPECIAL COOR-  
3 DINATOR FOR TIBETAN ISSUES.—Of the amounts author-  
4 ized to be appropriated to the Department of State for  
5 administration of foreign affairs, not less than \$1,000,000  
6 is authorized to be appropriated for fiscal year 2020 and  
7 each subsequent fiscal year for the Office of the United  
8 States Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues.

9 (b) TIBETAN SCHOLARSHIP PROGRAM AND  
10 “NGWANG CHOEPHEL EXCHANGE PROGRAMS”.—Of the  
11 amounts authorized to be appropriated for educational  
12 and cultural exchange programs for fiscal year 2020 and  
13 each subsequent fiscal year—

14 (1) not less than \$750,000 is authorized to be  
15 appropriated to carry out the Tibetan scholarship  
16 program established under section 103(b)(1) of the  
17 Human Rights, Refugee, and Other Foreign Rela-  
18 tions Provisions Act of 1996 (Public Law 104–319;  
19 22 U.S.C. 2151 note); and

20 (2) not less than \$650,000 is authorized to be  
21 appropriated to carry out the “Ngwang Choepel Ex-  
22 change Programs” (formerly known as “programs of  
23 educational and cultural exchange between the  
24 United States and the people of Tibet”) under sec-  
25 tion 103(a) of the Human Rights, Refugee, and  
26 Other Foreign Relations Provisions Act of 1996.

1       (c) HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE TO TIBETAN REFUG-  
2       GEES IN SOUTH ASIA.—Of the amounts authorized to be  
3       appropriated for migration and refugee assistance for fis-  
4       cal year 2020 and each subsequent fiscal year, such sums  
5       as may be necessary are authorized to be appropriated for  
6       humanitarian assistance, including food, medicine, cloth-  
7       ing, and medical and vocational training, to Tibetan refu-  
8       gees in South Asia who have fled facing a credible threat  
9       of persecution in the People’s Republic of China.

10       (d) DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE.—Of the funds ap-  
11       propriated under the heading Economic Support Fund for  
12       fiscal year 2020 and each subsequent fiscal year, not less  
13       than \$6,000,000 is authorized for programs to promote  
14       and preserve Tibetan culture and language both in the ref-  
15       ugee and diaspora Tibetan communities, development, and  
16       the resilience of Tibetan communities and the Central Ti-  
17       betan Administration in India and Nepal, and to assist  
18       in the education and development of the next generation  
19       of Tibetan leaders from such communities.

20       (e) TIBETAN GOVERNANCE.—Of the funds appro-  
21       priated under the heading “Economic Support Fund” for  
22       fiscal year 2020 and each subsequent fiscal year, not less  
23       than \$3,000,000 is authorized for programs to strengthen  
24       the capacity of the Central Tibetan Administration, insti-

- 1 tutions and strengthen democracy, governance, informa-
- 2 tion and international outreach, and research.

